RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS of a COURT OF INQUIRY
U. S. Naval Submarine Base New London Groton, Connecticut Unclassified made the blook of their their PDF ! Support their creativity by buying their blook or create your own now on BlookUp!
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Published on June 21, 2025
That the normal operating mode of constant vents as set forth
in the Ship Information Book and plans for THRESHER is for them to
be open.
That the specifications for building submarines do not require
a low pressure auxiliary sea water system.
That the normal operating modes of the auxiliary sea water,
main sea water, air conditioning and trim and drain valves in
THRESHER called for them to be fully open to reduce friction losses
and noise in the systems.
That vital electrical switchboards installed in THRESHER were
protected from water dripping, but not fully from spray from below
or from mechanical derangement from a water stream.
That certain alternate and supplementing identical equipments
were located in close proximity to each other. For example the
two lube oil pumps for each shipts service turbogenerator set
on THRESHER Class are set in a lower level pocket just to port
and starboard of the centerline near Frame 81; control oil for
shipts service turbogenerator throttles is supplied by these lube
oil pumps. The 400-cycle motor generator sets are located in close
proximity in the engine room.
That the KW ship's service motor generator sets and their
electrical switching and other connections are located in the
auxiliary machinery space in close proximity. They provide for
conversion ofvolt A. C. to volt D.C. under normal conditions
of the Ship's Service turbogenerator sets providing power, or, when
power is provided by the battery or the diesel generator, convert
volt D.C. tovolt A.C. Much of the ship's vital electrical
and indicating equipment is supplied from volt A.C. sources
(or transformed therefrom).
That a casualty to BARBEL during the latter stages of
THRESHER's construction, focused attention on the inadequacy of
quality assurance methods employed in fabrication of silver braze
joints in submarine construction by Portsmouth Naval Shipyard prior
to 1961.
That subsequent to an investigation of the BARBEL casualty,
silver braze joints in THRESHER's vital systems were subjected to
visual examinations, mallet tests, chemical material re-identification
tests, hydrostatic tests and hydraulic pressure cycling tests.
That there was no extensive retrofit of silver braze joints
in THRESHER.
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in the Ship Information Book and plans for THRESHER is for them to
be open.
That the specifications for building submarines do not require
a low pressure auxiliary sea water system.
That the normal operating modes of the auxiliary sea water,
main sea water, air conditioning and trim and drain valves in
THRESHER called for them to be fully open to reduce friction losses
and noise in the systems.
That vital electrical switchboards installed in THRESHER were
protected from water dripping, but not fully from spray from below
or from mechanical derangement from a water stream.
That certain alternate and supplementing identical equipments
were located in close proximity to each other. For example the
two lube oil pumps for each shipts service turbogenerator set
on THRESHER Class are set in a lower level pocket just to port
and starboard of the centerline near Frame 81; control oil for
shipts service turbogenerator throttles is supplied by these lube
oil pumps. The 400-cycle motor generator sets are located in close
proximity in the engine room.
That the KW ship's service motor generator sets and their
electrical switching and other connections are located in the
auxiliary machinery space in close proximity. They provide for
conversion ofvolt A. C. to volt D.C. under normal conditions
of the Ship's Service turbogenerator sets providing power, or, when
power is provided by the battery or the diesel generator, convert
volt D.C. tovolt A.C. Much of the ship's vital electrical
and indicating equipment is supplied from volt A.C. sources
(or transformed therefrom).
That a casualty to BARBEL during the latter stages of
THRESHER's construction, focused attention on the inadequacy of
quality assurance methods employed in fabrication of silver braze
joints in submarine construction by Portsmouth Naval Shipyard prior
to 1961.
That subsequent to an investigation of the BARBEL casualty,
silver braze joints in THRESHER's vital systems were subjected to
visual examinations, mallet tests, chemical material re-identification
tests, hydrostatic tests and hydraulic pressure cycling tests.
That there was no extensive retrofit of silver braze joints
in THRESHER.
b(1) b(1) b(1)
(U
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